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          NO. 44502 
 
          Bannock County Case No.  
          CR-2014-13789 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Katz failed to establish the district court abused its discretion, either by 
imposing concurrent unified sentences of six years, with three years fixed, for two 
counts of sexual exploitation of a child; by relinquishing jurisdiction; or by denying his 
Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence? 
 
 
Katz Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
 
 Katz pled guilty to two counts of sexual exploitation of a child (in violation of I.C. § 
18-1507(2)(a)), and the district court imposed unified sentences of six years, with three 
years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.101-07, 119.)  After the period of retained 
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jurisdiction the district court relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.119-21.)  Katz filed a 
notice of appeal timely from the judgement of conviction.  (R., pp.122-25.)  He also filed 
a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentences, which the district court denied.  
(R., pp.135-49, 151-52.)   
Katz asserts his sentences are excessive in light of his family support, mental 
health issues, purported remorse, and acceptance of responsibility.  (Appellant’s brief, 
pp.4-6.)  The record supports the sentences imposed.   
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire 
length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.  State v. McIntosh, 160 
Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 
217, 226 (2008).  It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the 
defendant's probable term of confinement.  State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 
P.3d 687, 391 (2007).  Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.  McIntosh, 160 Idaho 
at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted).  To carry this burden the appellant must show 
the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.  Id.  A sentence is 
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting 
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or 
retribution.  Id.  “In deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.”  McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 
368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).  
Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily 
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not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial court.”  Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 
103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).  
The maximum prison sentence for sexual exploitation of a child (in violation of 
I.C. § 18-1507(2)(a)) is 10 years.  I.C. § 18-1507(3).  The district court imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of six years, with three years fixed, which fall well within 
the statutory guidelines.  (R., pp.101-07, 119.)  Katz’s asserts that the district court did 
not take into consideration his family support or mental health issues; however, this 
information was before the court at the time of sentencing.  (PSI, pp. 61-62, 70-72.)  
While the district court is not required to articulate its consideration of every sentencing 
factor, it did articulate its consideration of the information contained in the PSI and in the 
psychosexual evaluation.  (See, e.g., 11/30/15 Tr., p.18, Ls.8-10; p.18, L.25 – p.19, 
L.4.)  Katz also asserts that he is remorseful and has taken responsibility for his actions; 
however the Pre-Sentence Investigator states that Katz had a lack of responsibility and 
remorse for his actions.  (PSI, p.74.)  At sentencing, the district court set forth its 
reasons for imposing Katz’s sentence.  (11/30/15 Tr., p.19, L.7 – p.23, L.17.)  The 
district court took into account Katz’s sexual history, noting that Katz has had sex with 
underage females and is not amenable to treatment in the community.  (11/30/15 Tr., 
p.18, L.23 – p.19, L.4.)  The district court also noted that Katz had a poor attitude, failed 
his polygraph, and was high on the first day of his psychosexual evaluation.  (11/30/15 
Tr., p.19, Ls.19-22.)  The district court concluded that Katz needed significant treatment, 
and that the treatment could not be accomplished in the community.  (11/30/15 Tr., 
p.22, Ls.12-17.)  The state submits Katz has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, 
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for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing 
transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.  (Appendix A.)  
Katz next asserts the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his “limited successes” during the retained jurisdiction program and 
his mental health issues.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)  Katz has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion.   
Whether to place a defendant on probation or relinquish jurisdiction are both 
matters within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal 
absent an abuse of that discretion.  I.C. § 19-2601(4); see State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 
711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 
596-97 (Ct. App. 1990).  A court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed 
an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.  State 
v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).    
Katz’s performance during the retained jurisdiction program was poor as 
evidenced by the fact that Katz received six verbal warnings, seven written warnings, 
two incident reports, and two DOR’s during the program.  (PSI, pp.147-48.)  The two 
DOR’s were both for unauthorized transfer of property, and both times Katz was more 
concerned with who had told on him than correcting the bad behavior.  (PSI, pp.147-
48.)  Katz failed to complete programming, frequently came to group without doing the 
practice work, lacked commitment and work ethic, would introduce irrelevant topics and 
continue to talk about them over the facilitator trying to get him back on topic, and did 
not accept feedback from either his peers or the facilitator.  (PSI., pp.149-50.)  Katz 
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struggled with his attitude, and staff reported that, while working in the kitchen, Katz did 
as little as possible, pointed out others’ faults, got into arguments, and instigated 
horseplay and then blamed others for “carrying it too far.”  (PSI, p.150.)  In 
recommending that the court relinquish jurisdiction, staff wrote, “[Katz] did not seem to 
learn from disciplinary actions and continued to do what he wanted to do.  He was more 
focused on not getting caught than he was on learning how to not do the behavior 
again.”  (PSI, p.152.)  The staff also noted that Katz’s response to getting caught with 
contraband was almost identical to when he was caught with pornography.  (PSI, 
p.152.)  Katz’s abysmal performance in the retained jurisdiction program did not warrant 
probation.  The state submits Katz has failed to establish that the district court abused 
its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.   
Finally, Katz asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 
35 motion for reduction of his sentence in light of a letter he wrote to the court, several 
coursework certifications, because he had “employment opportunities”, and because he 
could receive sex offender treatment within the community.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8-9.)  If 
a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under 
Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this Court reviews the denial of the motion for an 
abuse of discretion.  State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho, 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
 To prevail on appeal, Katz must “show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion.”  Id.  Katz has failed to satisfy his burden.   
At the Rule 35 hearing, the district court considered the information presented by 
Katz, but rejected it as a reason to reduce Katz’s sentences, stating: “I don’t even know 
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what I was thinking to give him a chance for a rider in the first place.  I guess maybe I 
was just seeing what he might do. What he ended up doing was two DOR’s, 17 informal 
sanctions, and totally unresponsive to directions.” (10/17/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5.)  
Considering Katz’s lack of effort and poor performance on his rider, he failed to 
demonstrate in the motion that his sentences are excessive.  Having failed to make 
such a showing, he has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Katz’s convictions and 
sentences, the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction, and the district court’s 
order denying Katz’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
       




      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming_______ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      ALICIA HYMAS 
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